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S Ebrahim 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The interpretation to be accorded to the term benefits in section 186(2)(a) of the 
Labour Relations Act1 (LRA) has come before the Courts on several occasions. In 
terms of section 186(2)(a) of the LRA any unfair act or omission by an employer 
relating to the provision of benefits to an employee falls within the ambit of an unfair 
labour practice. In Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd2 the Labour Court3 
held that the term benefit could not be interpreted to include remuneration. It stated 
that a benefit is something extra from remuneration.4 In Gaylard v Telkom South 
Africa Ltd5 the LC endorsed the decision in Samsung and held that if benefits were 
to be interpreted to include remuneration then this would curtail strike action with 
regard to issues of remuneration.6 In Hospersa v Northern Cape Provincial 
Administration7 the issue regarding the interpretation of the term benefits did not 
relate to whether or not it included remuneration but rather to whether or not it 
included the hope of creating new benefits which were non-existent. The Labour 
Appeal Court8 held that the term benefits refers only to benefits which exist ex 
contractu or ex lege but does not include the hope of creating new benefits.9 The 
                                        
  Shamier Ebrahim. LLB (NMMU). Lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law, College of Law, 
University of South Africa. Advocate of the High Court of South Africa. Email: 
ebrahs@unisa.ac.za. 
1  Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter referred to as the "LRA"). 
2  Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 1997 10 BLLR 1364 (LC) (hereafter referred to as 
"Samsung"). 
3  Hereafter referred to as the "LC". 
4  Samsung 1368. 
5  Gaylard v Telkom South Africa Ltd 1998 9 BLLR 942 (LC) (hereafter referred to as "Gaylard"). 
6  Gaylard para 22. 
7  Hospersa v Northern Cape Provincial Administration 2000 21 ILJ 1066 (LAC) (hereafter referred to 
as "Hospersa"). 
8  Hereafter referred to as the "LAC". 
9  Hospersa paras 8-9. 
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LAC adopted this approach in order to maintain the separation between a dispute of 
interest and one of mutual interest, the latter being subject to arbitration whilst the 
former is subject to the collective bargaining process (strike action). 
 
In Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA10 the LC disagreed with the reasoning in Samsung and 
held that the term remuneration as defined in section 213 of the LRA is wide enough 
to include payment to employees which may be described as benefits. The LC 
remarked that the statement in Samsung to the effect that a benefit is something 
extra from remuneration goes too far. It further remarked that the concern that the 
right to strike will be curtailed if remuneration were to fall within the ambit of 
benefits need not persist. It based this statement on the reasoning that if the issue 
in dispute concerns a demand by employees that certain benefits be granted then 
this is a matter for the collective bargaining process (strike action), but where the 
issue in dispute concerns the fairness of the employer's conduct then this is subject 
to arbitration.11 
 
It is then no surprise that the issue regarding the interpretation of the term benefits 
once again came before the LAC in Apollo Tyres South Africa (Pty) Limited v CCMA.12 
The LAC was tasked with deciding if the term could be interpreted to include a 
benefit which is to be granted subject to the discretion of the employer upon 
application by the employee. In deciding this, the LAC overturned the decisions in 
Samsung and Hospersa and opted to follow the decision in Protekon. 
 
Apollo is worthy of note as it is the latest contribution from the LAC regarding the 
interpretation of the term benefits and it is of binding force for the Commission for 
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration13 and Labour Courts14 in terms of the principle 
of stare decisis. The purpose of this note is threefold. Firstly, the facts, arguments 
and judgment in Apollo will be stated briefly. Secondly, the judgment will be critically 
                                        
10  Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 2005 JOL 14544 (LC) (hereafter referred to as "Protekon"). 
11  Protekon paras 19, 21-22. 
12  Apollo Tyres South Africa (Pty) Limited v CCMA 2013 ZALAC 3 (hereafter referred to as "Apollo"). 
13  Hereafter referred to as the CCMA.  
14  This includes the LAC. 
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anaylsed and commented upon. Thirdly, this note will conclude by commenting on 
the way forward for benefit disputes in terms of section 186(2)(a) of the LRA. 
 
2 The salient facts 
 
Apollo's case came before the LAC as an appeal from the Labour Court. Hoosen15 
was employed by Apollo Tyres South Africa (Pty) Limited16. During 2008 the 
appellant informed its employees that it intended to initiate an early retirement 
scheme17. A notice relating to the scheme was placed on the notice boards at the 
appellant's premises. The notice stated that the scheme would apply only to monthly 
paid staff who were between the ages of 46 and 59 years old. It stated that a 
successful applicant would receive two months additional pay and an ex-gratia 
payment computed on a sliding scale depending on the age of the applicant. It 
further stated that entry into the scheme would be subject to the discretion of 
management and that the normal retirement benefits would remain applicable. 
Hoosen applied for entry into the scheme but her application was refused on the 
basis that she needed to be 55 years old in order to qualify for entry, which was the 
practice of the employer. Hoosen was 49 years old at the relevant time.18 
 
3 The crisp issue 
 
The crisp issue for determination was whether an employee who alleges an unfair 
labour practice relating to the provision of benefits in terms of section 186(2)(a) of 
the LRA will have a remedy only if such an employee can prove that he/she has a 
right or entitlement to the benefits ex contractu or ex lege.19 Put differently, does an 
employee have a remedy in terms of section 186(2)(a) of the LRA if the benefit is to 
be granted subject to the discretion of the employer upon application by the 
employee? 
                                        
15  Hoosen was the employee party and the third respondent in the appeal before the LAC. 
16  Apollo Tyres South Africa (Pty) Limited was the appellant in the appeal before the LAC. 
17  Hereafter referred to as "the scheme". 
18  Apollo paras 1-2, 4-5, 8. 
19  Apollo para 1. 
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4 Arguments by both parties 
 
4.1 The appellant 
 
The appellant argued that an employee may not rely on section 186(2)(a) of the LRA 
to create a new right as the section applies only to unfair conduct relating to an 
existing right. The appellant argued that fairness and clarity dictate that unfair 
conduct should be reprehensible only with regard to existing rights, and Hospersa 
provides clarity in this regard as the judgment respects the distinction between a 
rights dispute and one of mutual interest. The appellant further argued that the 
resultant of the distinction is that it avoids a situation where new rights may be 
created by recourse to the unfair labour practice jurisdiction, and thus avoids a 
duplication of remedies.20 
 
4.2 The respondent 
 
The respondent21 argued that section 186(2)(a) of the LRA does provide a remedy 
to an aggrieved claimant such as Hoosen, who has no other remedy in the LRA or 
the common law. The respondent further argued that the term benefit should be 
construed wider than contractual entitlements22 as this would be in accordance with 
the purpose and effect of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction; and Hospersa was 
incorrectly decided.23 
 
5 Judgment 
 
The LAC overturned the decision in Samsung and the resultant authorities24 which 
distinguished between remuneration and a benefit as the approach in order to 
                                        
20  Apollo para 31. 
21  Respondent refers to Hoosen, who was the third respondent. 
22  One would assume also wider than ex lege entitlements. 
23  Apollo para 32. 
24  Samsung; Northen Cape Provincial Administration v Comissioner Hambridge 1999 20 ILJ 1910 
(LC); Gaylard. 
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accord meaning to the term benefits. The rationale for this approach is that if the 
term benefits is interpreted to include any advantage or right in terms of the 
employment contract including wages, this would preclude strikes and lock-outs.25 
The LAC noted that it is clear from the case law and academic writings that the term 
benefit in the context of section 186(2)(a) of the LRA is imprecise and defies 
definition.26 The LAC, rejecting this approach, held that the distinction postulated by 
the approach was artificial and unsustainable because the definition of remuneration 
in terms of section 213 of the LRA is wide enough to include benefits.27 
 
The LAC overturned the decision in Hospersa and the resultant authorities28 which 
require the benefit to exist ex contractu or ex lege as the approach in order to 
accord meaning to the term benefits. The rationale for this approach is to maintain 
the separation between disputes of interest and disputes of right as a failure to do 
so would result in the collective bargaining process being undermined.29 
 
The LAC followed the authorities30 which have voiced a move away from Hospersa. 
According to these authorities item 2(1)(b)31 of Schedule 7 to the LRA creates a 
statutory right (an ex lege right) not to be subjected to an unfair labour practice 
relating inter alia to the provision of benefits;32 section 186(2)(a)33 cannot be used 
to create new benefits, new forms of remuneration, or new policies not previously 
provided by the employer - this should be left to the process of collective 
                                        
25  Gaylard para 22. 
26  Apollo para 20. 
27  Apollo para 25. 
28  Hospersa; Gauteng Provinsiale Administasie v Scheepers 2000 21 ILJ 1305 (LAC); GS4 Security 
Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd v NASGAWU (LAC) unreported case number DA3/08 of 26 November 
2009). See also Sithole v Nogwaza 1999 12 BLLR 1348 (LC) para 47 wherein the LC held that a 
benefit arises out of a contract of employment. 
29  Hospersa para 10. 
30  Protekon; IMATU obo Verster v Umhlathuze Municipality 2011 JOL 27258 (LC) (hereafter referred 
to as "IMATU"); Department of Justice v CCMA 2004 25 ILJ 248 (LAC) (hereafter referred to as 
"Department of Justice"); Eskom v Marshall 2002 23 ILJ 2251 (LC). 
31  Item 2(1)(b) has been removed from Schedule 7 to the LRA. Item 2(1)(b) provided for an unfair 
labour practice, inter alia, relating to the provision of benefits. Item 2(1)(b) was subsequently 
placed in s 186(2)(a) of the LRA, see Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 482. 
32  Department of Justice paras 53-54. 
33  Section 186(2)(a) of the LRA. 
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bargaining;34 the legislature has intended with regard to section 186(2)(a)35 to 
superimpose a duty of fairness regarding employer conduct irrespective of whether 
that duty exists expressly or impliedly in the contractual provisions that establish the 
benefit;36 section 186(2)(a) was introduced primarily to permit the scrutiny of 
employer conduct, inter alia, the exercise of employer discretion in relation to the 
provision of benefits;37 and the term benefits was intended to refer to advantages 
conferred on employees which did not arise from ex lege or ex contractu 
entitlements, but which have been granted at the employer's discretion.38 
 
The LAC (per Musi AJA) postulated the new approach39 as follows: 
 
In my view, the better approach would be to interpret the term benefit to include a 
right or entitlement to which the employee is entitled (ex contractu or ex lege 
including rights judicially created) as well as an advantage or privilege which has 
been offered or granted to an employee in terms of a policy or practice subject to 
the employer's discretion. In my judgment "benefit" in section 186(2)(a) of the Act 
means existing advantages or privileges to which an employee is entitled as a right 
or granted in terms of a policy or practice subject to the employer's discretion. In 
as far as Hospersa, GS4 Security and Scheepers postulate a different approach they 
are, with respect, wrong.40 
 
The LAC further held that if Hospersa was applied to the facts in casu it would mean 
that the employer could act with impunity because Hoosen would not have a remedy 
in the civil courts as no contract came into being Neither would she have a remedy 
in terms of section 186(2)(a) of the LRA as she does not have a contractual right to 
the benefit and being a single employee she would not have the right to strike as 
stated in Samsung. The LAC then stated that in a case like Hoosen's the notion that 
the benefit must be based on an ex contractu or ex lege entitlement would render 
section 186(2)(a) sterile. The LAC concluded that there was no acceptable, fair or 
                                        
34  Protekon para 32. 
35  Section 186(2)(a) of the LRA. 
36  Protekon para 34. 
37  Protekon para 35. 
38  IMATU para 21. 
39  Emphasis added. 
40  Apollo para 50. See also South African Revenue Services v Ntshintshi 2013 ZALCCT 17 paras 36-
37, wherein Steenkamp J found himself bound to follow Apollo in terms of the principle of stare 
decisis and held that a travel allowance offered to all fieldworkers in terms of a collective 
agreement must fall within the broad definition of benefit as postulated in Apollo. 
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rational reason as to why Hoosen was not allowed entry into the scheme in 
circumstances where she qualified to participate in the same, the resultant being 
that the employer did not exercise its discretion fairly, thus committing an unfair 
labour practice. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.41 
 
6 Comments 
 
6.1 Does the term "benefits" include remuneration? 
 
The correct approach to interpreting the provisions of the LRA was stated in Aviation 
Union of South Africa v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd,42 wherein the Constitutional 
Court43 held that section 3 of the LRA is the starting point and mandates an 
interpretation which complies with the Constitution and public international law 
whilst giving effect to the primary objects of the LRA.44 Section 186(2)(a) of the LRA 
gives effect to section 23(1) of the Constitution which provides for the right to fair 
labour practices. This means that the term benefit must be accorded an 
interpretation that gives effect to section 23(1) of the Constitution. In NEHAWU v 
University of Cape Town45 the CC held that section 23(1) is not defined in the 
Constitution and is incapable of precise decision. It remarked that the Labour Courts 
are responsible for the interpretation of the LRA, which was enacted to give effect to 
section 23(1) of the Constitution, and should seek guidance from domestic and 
international experience in this regard. It stated that international experience is 
reflected in both the Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour 
Organisation as well as related foreign instruments.46 
 
                                        
41  Apollo paras 48, 59-60, 63. 
42  Aviation Union of South Africa v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2011 ZACC 39. 
43  Hereafter referred to as the CC. 
44  Aviation Union of South Africa v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2011 ZACC 39 para 34. 
45  NEHAWU v University of Cape Town 2003 24 ILJ 95 (CC). 
46  NEHAWU v University of Cape Town 2003 24 ILJ 95 (CC) paras 33-34 
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Article 1(a) of the Equal Remuneration Convention47 defines remuneration as 
follows: 
 
the ordinary, basic or minimum wage or salary and any additional emoluments 
whatsoever payable directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, by the 
employer to the worker and arising out of the worker's employment. 
 
Oelz et al states that this definition is broad enough to include all elements in 
addition to the basic wage.48 
 
Article 141(2) of the EC Treaty defines pay as follows: 
 
the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether 
in cash or in kind, which the worker receives directly or indirectly, in respect of his 
employment, from his employer.49 
 
Duggan states that the Courts have interpreted this definition expansively so as to 
include payments made during or after employment, fringe benefits, severance 
payments, occupational pensions and redundancy payments. He further states that 
the definition also covers non-contractual pay such as a discretionary bonus.50 It 
should be noted that these two definitions are related to equal pay discrimination. It 
is, however, suggested that the definitions and the commentary thereon provide 
guidance regarding the interpretation of remuneration in section 213 of the LRA. 
 
According to Apollo the distinction drawn by the Courts between benefits and 
remuneration is artificial and not sustainable, because the definition of remuneration 
in section 213 of the LRA is wide enough to include benefits.51 In terms of section 
213 of the LRA, remuneration means: 
 
                                        
47  Equal Remuneration Convention 100 of 1951. 
48  Oelz, Olney and Manuel Equal Pay 24. 
49  Duggan Equal Pay 57. 
50  Duggan Equal Pay 57. 
51  Apollo para 25. See also Le Roux 1997 CLL 96-97; Le Roux 2005 CLL 2. Protekon para 19. 
SACCAWU v Garden Route Chalets (Pty) Ltd 1997 3 BLLR 325 (CCMA). 
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any payment in money or in kind, or both in money and in kind, made or owing to 
any person in return for that person working for any other person, including the 
State. 
 
It is thus clear that the international practice is to interpret the term remuneration to 
include benefits. The finding by Apollo, that the definition of remuneration in section 
213 of the LRA is wide enough to include benefits, accords with this practice even 
though it does not make reference to the practice in the finding. 
 
Samsung excluded remuneration from the definition of benefits on the basis that it is 
not listed as an unfair labour practice and the legislature would have listed it as such 
if it so wished.52 This reasoning follows the literal approach of interpretation and 
ignores the purposive approach (section 3 of the LRA) with all that it encompasses.53 
NEHAWU makes it clear that the Labour Courts are responsible for interpreting the 
LRA. Furthermore, international practice interprets the term remuneration to include 
benefits. It is suggested that as a corollary thereof, benefits includes remuneration. 
In the light of the above, it is suggested that Apollo correctly rejected the decision in 
Samsung. 
 
One remaining issue here is the concern echoed in Gaylard that if the term 
"benefits" includes remuneration then this would preclude strike action.54 The 
concern stems from the distinction between a dispute of right and one of mutual 
interest. The latter is subject to collective bargaining whilst the former is subject to 
arbitration. The concern is that the right to strike will be curtailed because matters 
of mutual interest relating to remuneration would be subject to arbitration and be 
barred from strike action in terms of section 65(1)(c) of the LRA. The concern is 
misplaced, because a claim to new forms of remuneration will be a matter of mutual 
interest which is subject to collective bargaining and thus falls outside the scope of 
arbitration. Disputes concerning unfairness relating to the provision of remuneration 
                                        
52  Samsung 1368. 
53  Grogan Employment Rights 123 states that neither Samsung nor Hambridge has provided 
compelling reasons as to why disputes concerning remuneration should be excluded from the 
ambit of s 186(2)(a) of the LRA, as remuneration is the most important benefit to the employee. 
54  Gaylard para 22.  
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are subject to arbitration and will not form the subject matter for collective 
bargaining.55 
 
6.2 Does the benefit have to exist ex contractu or ex lege? 
 
Apollo rejected the approach in Hospersa to the effect that a benefit has to exist ex 
lege or ex contractu in order to be arbitrable in terms of section 186(2)(a) of the 
LRA. It is suggested that Apollo employed the correct reasoning in rejecting the 
Hospersa approach. Apollo's reasoning was that if Hospersa was applied to the facts 
in casu it would mean that the employer could act with impunity because Hoosen 
(the employee) would not have a remedy in the civil courts, as no contract had 
come into being, neither would she have a remedy in terms of section 186(2)(a) of 
the LRA as she did not have a contractual right to the benefits, and being a single 
employee she would not have the right to strike as stated in Schoeman.56 This 
suggestion finds support in the minority judgment in Department of Justice, wherein 
Goldstein AJA held that item 2(1)(b) (now section 186(2)(a) of the LRA) was 
designed for situations where neither the employment contract nor the common law 
provided a remedy to the employee. It is thus clear that if it is insisted upon that the 
benefit must exist ex contractu or ex lege in order to found the remedy in section 
186(2)(a) of the LRA then a single employee faced with unfair conduct by her 
employer in relation to a benefit being granted to her subject to the employer's 
discretion upon application would be destitute and without remedy. This could never 
have been the intention of the legislature with regard to the term benefits as an 
unfair labour practice and it is also contrary to the purpose of the LRA. It is apposite 
to note that the definition of remuneration in article 141(2) of the EC Treaty covers 
non-contractual payments.57 This lends credence to the rejection of Hospersa. 
 
                                        
55  Le Roux 2006 ILJ 61 referring to Protekon has suggested that: "The question is therefore not 
whether the benefit is apart or not from remuneration, but whether the 'issue in dispute 
concerns a demand by employees that certain benefits be granted or reinstated' or whether 'the 
issue in dispute is fairness of the employer's conduct'. The former cannot be the subject of 
arbitration, but the latter can." 
56  Apollo para 48. 
57  Duggan Equal Pay 57. 
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The concern that a claim to a new benefit could be arbitrable as an unfair labour 
practice is misplaced. In Apollo's definition, the term benefit refers only to existing 
rights or entitlements to which the employee is entitled ex contractu or ex lege and 
existing advantages or privileges to which an employee is entitled as a right or 
granted in terms of a policy or practice subject to the discretion of the employer.58 
This definition effectively removes the concern that a claim to new benefits may be 
arbitrable in terms of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction. The definition refers only 
to existing benefits and not to a claim to new benefits. 
 
6.3 The impact of section 65(1)(c) of the LRA on the right to strike 
within the context of a benefits dispute in section 186(2)(a) of the 
LRA 
 
In Protekon the LC held that employees involved in disputes relating to benefits may 
choose to engage the employer in the collective bargaining arena instead of trying to 
prove unfairness as required by section 186(2)(a) of the LRA, and that the LRA does 
not preclude an employee from doing both at the same time.59 Apollo, which was 
concerned with these remarks, made reference to Maritime Industries Trade Union 
of SA v Transnet Ltd60 and held that the scheme of the LRA is to provide an 
employee with an election between referring the matter to arbitration and 
embarking on strike action.61 The glaring omission in Apollo is that it did not explain 
whether or not an employee has that election with regards to a benefit dispute. 
 
In terms of section 65(1)(c) of the LRA no person may take part in a strike if the 
issue in dispute is one that a party has the right to refer to arbitration or to the LC in 
terms of the LRA. In terms of section 191(5)(a)(iv) of the LRA62 an employee has 
the right to refer an unfair labour practice dispute relating to the provision of 
benefits to arbitration. This would mean that if the benefits dispute falls within the 
                                        
58  Apollo para 50. 
59  Protekon para 25. 
60  Maritime Industries Trade Union of SA v Transnet Ltd 2002 23 ILJ 2213 (LAC). 
61  Apollo paras 29-30. 
62  Read with s 186(2)(a) of the LRA. 
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ambit of section 186(2)(a) of the LRA then the employee would be barred in terms 
of section 65(1)(c) from embarking on strike action as the employee would have the 
right to refer the benefits dispute to arbitration in terms of section 191(5)(a)(iv). It is 
suggested that section 65(1)(c) of the LRA is conclusive as to whether an employee 
may refer the matter to arbitration or whether the matter may be dealt with in terms 
of the collective bargaining process. It should be noted that section 65(1)(c) curtails 
the right to strike only where a party has the right to refer the dispute to 
arbitration/adjudication in terms of the LRA. 
 
Another issue which rears its head is the relationship between sections 64(4) and 
186(2)(a) of the LRA in the context of a benefits dispute where the benefit exists ex 
contractu. In Monyela v Bruce Jacobs t/a LV Construction63 the LC held that section 
64(4) of the LRA allows an employee to embark on strike action if the employer 
unilaterally changes the terms and conditions of employment. This is one of the 
exceptions where a dispute of right may be the subject matter of strike action. The 
LC stated that a unilateral change of the terms and conditions of employment means 
that the employer has taken certain things or benefits away or has failed to honour 
the terms and conditions of employment.64 At first blush it would seem that where 
an employee alleges a unilateral change in the terms and conditions of employment 
relating to the provision of benefits, the employee will have two avenues available, 
the first being in the form of strike action65 as provided for in section 64(4) of the 
LRA and the second in terms of referring the matter to arbitration as provided for in 
section 186(2)(a) of the LRA.66 
 
It is suggested that this anomaly may be resolved by adopting the following 
approach. Section 186(2)(a) of the LRA applies to disputes only where the employer 
                                        
63  Monyela v Bruce Jacobs t/a LV Construction 1998 19 ILJ 75 (LC). 
64  Monyela v Bruce Jacobs t/a LV Construction 1998 19 ILJ 75 (LC) 82J, 82B. See also Le Roux 2013 
CLL 79. 
65  The writer is mindful of the decision in Samsung 1367 to the effect that a single employee 
cannot embark on strike action. 
66  Le Roux 2013 CLL 79 commenting on Apollo's case is of the view that the fact that employees 
may have the right to embark on strike action or to institute legal proceedings in respect of the 
same dispute is irrelevant. The learned author states that the cardinal question is whether s 65 is 
applicable to a certain dispute or not. 
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has acted unfairly in relation to the provision of benefits.67 Unfairness, then, 
becomes a pre-requisite to trigger the cause of action in the section. If unfairness is 
absent from a dispute relating to a unilateral change in the terms and conditions of 
employment involving benefits, then it cannot be arbitrated in terms of section 
186(2)(a) of the LRA. An employee in such a case would then have the remedy in 
terms of section 64(4) of the LRA.68 Section 65(1)(c) of the LRA expressly restricts 
the right to strike where the employee has a right to refer the matter to arbitration 
or to the LC. This would mean that section 64(4) of the LRA cannot accommodate 
disputes relating to a unilateral change of the terms and conditions of employment 
involving unfair conduct relating to benefits.69 
 
It is suggested that in determining whether or not the dispute involves unfairness 
the CCMA and LC should look at the substance of the dispute and not the form, 
thereby ascertaining the true nature of the same.70 It is further suggested that an 
employee cannot determine the route her dispute should follow by merely making 
an allegation of unfairness to bring it within the ambit of section 186(2)(a) of the 
LRA and an employee can similarly not remove her claim from the ambit of section 
186(2)(a) of the LRA and bring it within the ambit of section 64(4) of the LRA if the 
substance of the dispute relates to unfairness which is arbitrable in terms of section 
186(2)(a) of the LRA.71 
                                        
67  It is clear upon a reading of s 186(2)(a) of the LRA that the section requires an unfair act or 
omission that arises between the employer and employee relating to the provision of benefits. 
68  The employee would then not be prevented from pursuing a contractual claim in the LC or High 
Court. See SAPU v National Commissioner of the South African Police Service 2006 1 BLLR 42 
(LC) paras 81-82; Nkutha v Fuel Gas Installatations (Pty) Ltd 2000 2 BLLR 178 (LC) paras 73- 74 
in this regard. 
69  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 304 suggests that s 64(4) of the LRA does not apply to a 
unilateral change to a benefit that may be stigmatised as an unfair labour practice. It is 
suggested that a dispute relating to the provision of benefits can be stigmatised as an unfair 
labour practice proper only if the employer acted unfairly. This suggestion is in accordance with 
the prescripts of s 186(2)(a) of the LRA. 
70  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 307. 
71  In Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v NCABAWU (2) 1997 18 ILJ 671 (LAC) 678A-B 
the LAC held that the union could not change the true nature of the dispute into a non-justiciable 
one by merely demanding a remedy which falls outside the ambit of the LRA. The LAC further 
held that if this were to be allowed it would mean that a dispute normally justiciable or arbitrable 
in terms of the LRA could be transformed into a strikeable issue simply by adding a demand to a 
remedy which falls outside the ambit of the LRA. The LAC remarked that this would be 
unacceptable. See also Protekon para 23 wherein the LC remarked that the court will look at the 
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7 Conclusion 
 
The judgment in Apollo is welcomed, as its interpretation of the term benefits 
accords with section 23 of the Constitution, international law and the purpose of 
section 186(2)(a) of the LRA. It correctly rejected the distinction between a benefit 
and remuneration in Samsung as being artificial. The LC in Samsung was concerned 
with a literal approach to interpreting benefits and disregarded totally the purposive 
approach. The rejection of Hospersa, likewise, is unassailable because the LC 
focused on fitting unfair conduct relating to benefits into the realm of a rights 
dispute, thereby losing sight of the mandatory interpretative method in section 3 of 
the LRA. Apollo correctly endorsed the decision in Protekon to the effect that a claim 
to new benefits falls within matters of mutual interest and is subject to the collective 
bargaining process, whereas a claim that the employer acted unfairly in relation to 
benefits is subject to arbitration. The most significant finding in Apollo relates to the 
remark that where an employer acts unfairly in the granting of a benefit to an 
employee, where it is to be granted subject to the employer's discretion, the only 
remedy she will have is in terms of section 186(2)(a) of the LRA. In these 
circumstances section 186(2)(a) of the LRA reigns supreme as it presents an 
aggrieved employee with the only remedy. This is where the remedy in section 
186(2)(a) is most needed. This finding makes the constitutional right to fair labour 
practices practicable for an aggrieved employee by providing her with an effective 
remedy. With regard to the impact on the right to strike within the context of section 
186(2)(a), section 65(1)(c) of the LRA is conclusive. Employers who grant benefits to 
their employees subject to their discretion will no longer be able to grant such 
benefits at their will or fancy but will have to act fairly. Gone are the days when such 
employees were without remedy. Employers no longer enjoy an unfettered 
discretion, as Apollo fetters them in accordance with the Constitution. 
                                                                                                                          
substance of the dispute and the characterisation of the same by a party is not necessarily 
conclusive. The LC further remarked that the court should ascertain the true nature of the 
dispute in order to determine if it is a dispute in terms of which a party has the right to refer 
same to arbitration. See further Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Professional Transport 
Workers Union (1) 1998 19 ILJ 260 (LAC) 269G-I; Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd v Adams 2000 
21 ILJ 924 (LAC) para 16 in this regard. 
S EBRAHIM    PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
610 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Literature 
 
Duggan Equal Pay 
Duggan M Equal Pay - Law and Practice (Jordans Bristol 2009) 
 
Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 
Du Toit D et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 5th ed 
(LexisNexis Durban 2006) 
 
Grogan Employment Rights 
Grogan J Employment Rights (Juta Cape Town 2010) 
 
Le Roux 1997 CLL 
Le Roux PAK "Preserving the Status Quo in Economic Disputes" 1997 CLL 
6(11) 93-98 
 
Le Roux 2005 CLL 
Le Roux PAK "What is an employment 'benefit'?" 2005 CLL 15(1) 5-6 
 
Le Roux 2013 CLL 
Le Roux PAK "What constitutes a 'benefit'?" 2013 CLL 22(8) 76-80 
 
Le Roux 2006 ILJ 
Le Roux R "The Anatomy of a Benefit: A Labyrinthine Enquiry" 2006 ILJ 53-66 
 
Oelz, Olney and Manuel Equal Pay 
Oelz M, Olney S and Manuel T Equal Pay: An Introductory Guide (ILO Geneva 
2013) 
 
S EBRAHIM    PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
611 
Case law 
 
Apollo Tyres South Africa (Pty) Limited v CCMA 2013 ZALAC 3 
Aviation Union of South Africa v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2011 ZACC 39 
Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v NCABAWU (2) 1997 18 ILJ 671 
(LAC) 
Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd v Adams 2000 21 ILJ 924 (LAC) 
Department of Justice v CCMA 2004 25 ILJ 248 (LAC) 
Eskom v Marshall 2002 23 ILJ 2251 (LC) 
Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Professional Transport Workers Union (1) 1998 
19 ILJ 260 (LAC) 
Gauteng Provinsiale Administasie v Scheepers 2000 21 ILJ 1305 (LAC) 
Gaylard v Telkom South Africa Ltd 1998 9 BLLR 942 (LC) 
GS4 Security Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd v NASGAWU (LAC) unreported case number 
DA3/08 of 26 November 2009 
Hospersa v Northen Cape Provincial Administration 2000 21 ILJ 1066 (LAC) 
IMATU obo Verster v Umhlathuze Municipality 2011 JOL 27258 (LC) 
Maritime Industries Trade Union of SA v Transnet Ltd 2002 23 ILJ 2213 (LAC) 
Monyela v Bruce Jacobs t/a LV Construction 1998 19 ILJ 75 (LC) 
NEHAWU v University of Cape Town 2003 24 ILJ 95 (CC) 
Nkutha v Fuel Gas Installatations (Pty) Ltd 2000 2 BLLR 178 (LC) 
Northen Cape Provincial Administration v Comissioner Hambridge 1999 20 ILJ 1910 
(LC) 
Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 2005 JOL 14544 (LC) 
SACCAWU v Garden Route Chalets (Pty) Ltd 1997 3 BLLR 325 (CCMA) 
SAPU v National Commissioner of the South African Police Service 2006 1 BLLR 42 
(LC) 
Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 1997 10 BLLR 1364 (LC) 
Sithole v Nogwaza 1999 12 BLLR 1348 (LC) 
South African Revenue Services v Ntshintshi 2013 ZALCCT 17 
 
S EBRAHIM    PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
612 
Legislation 
 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
 
International instruments 
 
Equal Remuneration Convention 100 of 1951 
Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) (1957) 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
BLLR  Butterworths Labour Law Reports 
CC  Constitutional Court 
LAC  Labour Appeal Court 
LC  Labour Court 
CCMA  Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration 
CLL  Contemporary Labour Law 
EC  European Community 
ILJ  Industrial Law Journal 
ILO  International Labour Organisation 
JOL  Judgments Online 
 
